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This paper reviews recent developments pertinent to
inter-country adoption in Southern and Eastern
Africa. In particular, it focuses on the tripartite roles
of governments, the judiciary and the international
community, including the international media. It
argues that a concerted effort towards
awareness-raising is required in order to harmonise
the respective roles of the above players, and in order
to better regulate the practice.
Of course, the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child 1989 (UNCRC) has been ratified by all African
countries with the exception of Somalia. The
countries under discussion are therefore bound by Art
21 of the UNCRC.1 Further to this, 48 of the 53
Member States of the African Union, including those
that have ratified the Hague Convention on
Protection of Children and Co-Operation in respect
of Inter-Country Adoption (29 May 1993) (Hague
Adoption Convention), are also signatories to the
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the
Child, 1990 (African Children’s Charter). This
Charter contains a provision similar to, but not on all
fours with, the UNCRC.2 However, these
international instruments are not the main focus of
this paper, as the Hague Adoption Convention is
widely regarded as the more detailed implementing
mechanism3 to give effect to the relevant provisions
of the UNCRC and the Charter.
Ratification of the Hague Adoption
Convention and Domestic Legislation on
Inter-country Adoption in Southern and
Eastern Africa
As is common knowledge, a growing number of
African countries have ratified, or are in the process
of ratifying, the Hague Adoption Convention. At this
point South Africa, Kenya, Burundi, Guinea,
Madagascar, Seychelles, Burkino Faso, Mali, Togo,
Cape Verde, and Mauritius (11 countries in all) have
acceded. But, for some of these countries, ratification
has not, at the time of writing, been followed by
implementation at the domestic level, due largely to
the slow passage of legislation designed to achieve
this. The South African Children’s Act 38 of 2005,
for example, which contains a dedicated chapter on
inter-country adoption (chapter 16), awaits a final
date of promulgation, the regulations and forms
having been finalised in late 2008. In Kenya,
regulations to provide for inter-country adoption and
to flesh out the provisions of the Children’s Act 2001
were adopted in 2008, and Madagascar was one of
the first countries in Africa to pass implementing
legislation, which came into effect in 2007.
Drafting of comprehensive and dedicated children’s
statutes is a trend that is under way across the
1 Article 21 provides that:
‘States parties that recognise and/or permit the system of
adoption shall ensure that the best interests of the child shall
be the paramount consideration and they shall:
(a) ensure that the adoption of a child is authorised only by
competent authorities who determine, in accordance with
applicable law and procedure and on the basis of all
pertinent and reliable information, that the adoption is
permissible in view of the child’s status concerning parents,
relatives and legal guardians and that, if required, the
persons have given their informed consent to the adoption
on the basis of such counselling as may be necessary;
(b) recognise that inter-country adoption may be considered
as an alternative means of child’s care if the child cannot be
placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any
suitable manner be cared for in the child’s country of origin;
(c) ensure that the child concerned by inter-country adoption
enjoys safeguards and standards equivalent to those existing
in the case of national adoptions;
(d) take all appropriate measures to ensure that, in inter-
country adoption, the placement does not result in improper
financial gain for those involved in it;
(e) promote, where appropriate, the objectives of the present
article by concluding bi-lateral or multi-lateral arrangements
or agreements, and endeavour, within this framework, to
ensure that the placement of the child in another country is
carried out by competent authorities or organs.’
2 Mezmur, ‘From Angelina (to Madonna) to Zoe’s Ark: What
are the “A–Z” lessons for international adoptions in
Africa?’ [2008] International Journal of Law, Policy and the
Family 1, at p 6, notes that Art 24 of the African Children’s
Charter provides for a special obligation on states ‘to
establish competent authorities’ while the UNCRC seems to
take the existence of such authorities for granted. Further,
the African Children’s Charter (Art 24(a)) expressly requires
the consent of ‘the appropriate persons concerned’ whereas
the UNCRC refers only to ‘the persons concerned’ in this
context. In addition the African Children’s Charter intro-
duces the notion of the avoidance of ‘trafficking’ in inter-
country adoptive processes (Art 24(d)), and obliges states to
provide for machinery ‘to monitor the [post-adoption] well
being of the adopted child’ (Art 24 (f)). [Emphasis added]
3 So, for example, the preamble to the Hague Adoption
Convention refers expressly to the principles set forth by
(inter alia) the UNCRC relating to inter-country adoption.
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subcontinent. A brief overview of this phenomenon,
and the details relevant to inter-country adoption, are
provided next.
In Malawi, the Children’s Bill 2005 sanctions
inter-country adoption as an alternative means of care
for a child who cannot be placed under foster care or
with an adoptive family, or cannot in any suitable
manner be cared for in Malawi, and provides for the
usual requirements of eligibility of the applicants,
counselling, and authority for the child to enter and
reside permanently in the receiving country.4 Of note
is a provision requiring the applicant or one of the
applicants, if not a relative of the child, to have
fostered the child in Malawi for a period of one year
(clause 3A(2)(d)).5 Furthermore, the Bill then goes on
to require that ‘the receiving country is a signatory to
and has implemented the [Hague] Convention on
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect
of Inter-Country Adoption.’6
Malawi, of course, is an African country which is
at the epicentre of inter-country adoption debates due
to several high profile cases that have entered the
public domain. As will be discussed below, in the
absence of promulgated statutory provisions,7 the
development of rules and standards governing
inter-country adoption in this country has thus far
been the preserve of the judiciary.
The South African Children’s Act purports to
regulate inter-country adoption in considerable detail,
with the aim of giving full effect to the Hague
Adoption Convention in order to make it law in the
Republic. So for instance, various sections detail the
functions of the Central Authority; the accreditation
of child protection organisations to provide
inter-country adoption services; the approval of
adoption working agreements; the prescribing of fees
and payments, as well as the annual submission of
financial statements to the Central Authority of fees
received and payments made, and so forth. Section
261, which is titled ‘Adoption of child from Republic
by person in Convention country’ sets a minimum
standard for applicants to be ‘fit and proper’ to
adopt, with no minimum period of residence in South
Africa, or prior fostering of the child required.
Indeed, from a close examination of both the
inter-country adoption provisions and those
pertaining to domestic adoption,8 it is not evident
that the prospective adoptive parent whose
application has been approved by the respective
Central Authorities has to appear in person in the
Republic at all!9
In the South African legislation, by contrast to that
of Malawi noted above, it is expressly provided that
the President may ‘enter into an agreement with a
foreign state that is not a State Party to the Hague
Convention on Inter-Country Adoption in respect of
any matter pertaining to the inter-country adoption of
children.’10 This possibility is elaborated fully in
s 262, titled ‘Adoption of child from republic by
person in non-Convention country’. In the lower
court decision in De Gree and Another v Webb and
another (Centre for Child Law, University of Pretoria,
Amicus Curiae),11 the Chief Director: Children in the
Department of Social Development deposed as
follows:
‘Most of the working agreements currently in
place are with other Hague countries that have
also ratified the Convention. The only exception
is a working agreement between Johannesburg
Child Welfare and Botswana. This agreement
was supported by the Department of Social
Development for the following reason:
Although the culture of the population in
Botswana differs from the population in South
Africa, it is not as radical as other countries.’12
Clearly the provisions related to inter-country
adoptions from non-Convention countries are
4 Clause 3A(1) and (2)(a)–(c) of the Draft Bill.
5 In the case of the new Children’s Act of Southern Sudan
(2009), s 90 requires not only residence for a period of 3
years prior to a foreigner adopting a Southern Sudanese
child, but in addition, fostering for a period of one year as
well. The Lesotho Child Welfare and Protection Bill (2005)
provides that a person who is not a Lesotho citizen may only
adopt a Mosotho child if he or she has stayed in Lesotho for
at least three years and has fostered the child for at least 2
years under the supervision of a social worker.
6 Despite the fact that Malawi itself is not yet a state party to
the Hague Adoption Convention nor is there, as far as can
be ascertained, any process of ratification underway.
7 Of course, there is an old Adoption of Children Act (Cap
26:01), which was the subject of judicial interpretation in
the first ‘Madonna case’ (see Mezmur, ‘ “As painful as
giving birth”: A Reflection on the Madonna Adoption Saga’
(2008) XLI(3) Comparative and International Law Journal
of Southern Africa 383–403).
8 Chapter 15 of the Act.
9 In Ethiopia, inter-country adoption can also be effected
without the applicant appearing in person in the country
and, in practice, after the adoption order has been made,
any authorised person can escort the child to the receiving
country (mostly the US). The above interpretation of the
South African position is reinforced by the as yet unpromul-
gated regulations to Chapter 16 of the Children’s Act, in
particular reg 128, which sets out the requirements for the
report on the applicant to be prepared by the Central
Authority of the receiving country. Regulation 28(1)(l)
requires the report to include ‘plans for relocation of the
children from the Republic to the place where the applicant
[from a Convention country] resides.’ A similar provision
(reg 132) applies where the applicant is from a non-
Convention country. Presence of the prospective adoptive
parents is indeed not an absolute requirement under the
Hague Adoption Convention – Art 19(2) reads thus: ‘The
Central Authorities of both States shall ensure that this
transfer [ie of the child] takes place in secure and appropri-
ate circumstances and, if possible, in the company of the
adoptive or prospective adoptive parents.’ [Emphasis added]
10 Section 255(1)(a).
11 2006 (6) SA 51 (W).
12 At pp 57–58.
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inspired by the possibility of intra-African adoption,
which from a policy perspective the South African
government appears to regard more favourably than
inter-continental adoptions.
A third feature of the South African inter-country
adoption provisions which is worthy of mention is to
be found in s 261(6)(a), which provides that: ‘The
Central Authority of the Republic may withdraw its
consent to the adoption of the child within a period
of 140 days [four and a half months] from the date
on which it has consented to the adoption, if it is in
the best interests of the child to do so.’
Moreover, in terms of s 261(7), the adoption order
issued by the South African court ‘takes effect only
after the period referred to in subs (6) has lapsed, and
the Central Authority has not withdrawn its consent
within the stated period’. The draft Regulations
contain details concerning the manner in which
consent must be withdrawn (by letter setting this out,
and stipulating the time and place where the child has
to be handed over to an identified representative of
the Central Authority of the Republic). Further,
provision is made for a suitably qualified or
experienced person (employed by the Department of
Social Development or by a child protection
organisation accredited to provide inter-country
adoption services) to act as escort to accompany a
child on his or her return to the Republic. Finally, the
travel arrangements for the child and escort must be
made by the Central Authority of the Republic, and
the costs for such travel are to be borne by the
Central Authority. Exactly the same provisions apply
to the return of a child from a non-Convention
country if the Central Authority withdraws its
consent.
There are two issues wrapped up in these
provisions. They may, on the one hand, give rise to
some consternation on the part of receiving countries
and would-be adoptive parents, who may fear
capricious withdrawal of consent by the South
African Central Authority. However, this fear is not
necessarily well-founded, as the possibility of
withdrawal must be seen in the light of both s 261(5)
of the South African Children’s Act and Art 17 of the
Hague Adoption Convention in its totality. Article 17
reads as follows:
‘Any decision in the State of origin that a child
should be entrusted to prospective adoptive
parents may only be made if –
a) the Central Authority of that State has ensured
that the prospective adoptive parents agree;
b) the Central Authority of the receiving State has
approved such decision, where such approval is
required by the law of that State or by the
Central Authority of the State of origin;
c) the Central Authorities of both States have
agreed that the adoption may proceed; and
d) it has been determined, in accordance with
Article 5, that the prospective adoptive parents
are eligible and suited to adopt and that the child
is or will be authorized to enter and reside
permanently in the receiving State.’
Section 261(5) confirms that a court may make an
order for the adoption of the child only where
(amongst other requirements) the arrangements for
the adoption of the child are in accordance with the
requirements of the Hague Adoption Convention,13
where the Central Authority of the receiving country
has agreed to the adoption of the child,14 and where
the Central Authority of the Republic has agreed to
the adoption of the child.15 In short, the prior
agreement of Central Authorities must be seen as a
significant bar to unjustified withdrawal of consent. It
must further be noted that the jurisprudence of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC
Committee) looks with disfavour upon legislative
scenarios which provide for the possibility of
revocation of adoption orders.16
Further to this, the best interests standard must be
the paramount concern of the Central Authority who
may be considering withdrawal, hence mere
irregularities in the process, or even outright
deception or trickery, may not in themselves
constitute sufficient grounds to withdraw consent, if
they are overridden by the child’s best interests.
The second issue relates to the possible limbo
situation created by the 140-day window period
provided for in the Act. It raises the question as to
what the legal status of the adoptive parents before
the order ‘takes effect’ actually is: as ‘not yet’
adopters, they potentially do not yet have any legal
relationship with the child. Legally therefore, they
would not be in a position to make important
decisions with regard to the child (such as, for
example, consenting to medical or surgical
procedures, applying for a passport for the child, etc).
By the same token, however, the ‘return’ procedures
contemplate that the child has in the interregnum left
the country, and is residing abroad. In effect, the child
is without any legal parents outside his or her state of
origin.17 This position seem irresoluble as the
provision now reads, since this is not a scenario
where the adoption takes provisional effect, subject to
what might be called a ‘resolutive condition’18 of
withdrawal of consent by the Central Authority. We
would propose that the wording of the Act in this
13 Section 261(5)(d).
14 The competent authority must have agreed in the instance of
an inter-country adoption to a non-Convention country:
s 262(5)(e).
15 Section 261(5)(f).
16 See, for instance, UNCRC Committee, Concluding Observa-
tions: Ethiopia, (CRC/C/ETH/CO/3) (2006), at para 43.
17 In the spirit of the co-operation envisaged by Art 1(b) of the
Hague Adoption Convention, one would imagine that the
Central Authority of the receiving state would have to play
an in loco parentis role if this becomes necessary.
18 As presently worded, the non-withdrawal of consent is
effectively a suspensive condition.
Fe
a
tu
re
s
MARCH [2010] IFL 88
regard requires amendment in order to clarify the
child’s position before the expiry of the 140-day
period.
The 1998 Children’s Act of Ghana permits only an
interim order to be made where the child is being
adopted by an applicant who is not a citizen of
Ghana, and such interim order must subsist for a
period of ‘not less than two years’ (s 73). So too,
clause 65(4) of the Child Welfare and Protection Bill
of Lesotho (2005) authorises the High Court to make
an interim inter-country adoption order for a period
of not less than two years on condition that
supervision of the child be done by social workers of
the country where the adoptive parents reside and to
postpone the determination of the application.
Contact
The Hague Adoption Convention, in Art 29, provides
that:
‘… there shall be no contact between the
prospective adoptive parents and the child’s
parents or any other person who has care of the
child until the requirements [prescribed for
inter-country adoptions in article 4 – notably
adoptability, fulfilment of the best interests
criterion, compliance with the subsidiarity
principle, and obtaining of the necessary consents
– and article 5 – eligibility and counselling of the
adoptive parents, and authority for the child to
enter the receiving state and reside there
permanently] have been met, unless the adoption
takes place within a family or unless the contact
is in compliance with the conditions established
by the competent authority of the state of origin.’
The Guide to Good Practice19 states that:
‘… some parents travel to the country of origin
to choose a child, and sometime even bargain
directly with the biological mothers. This practice
creates risks for the child’s rights and violates
article 29 of the Hague Convention. Contracting
states should have laws or procedures in place to
prevent such contact before matching20 and to
give effect to article 29.’21
This implicit ‘no contact’ rule in relation to any prior
meeting between would-be adoptive parent(s) and a
potential adoptee is reinforced by the logic of the
transmission procedure set out in Art 16 of the
Hague Adoption Convention, which clearly
contemplates a report-writing and decision-making
process in relation to the child by the Central
Authority of the state of origin before such decision is
communicated to the Central Authority of the
receiving state, which only then, in turn, is required
(in Art 17(a)) ‘to ensure that the prospective adoptive
parents agree’.
This ‘no contact with the child principle’22 is
bolstered by para 431 of the Guide to Good Practice,
in terms of which:
‘… it is generally accepted that the prospective
adoptive parents should not be permitted to
contact the Central Authority of the State of
origin directly, or travel there to try to make
contact with the child or the child’s carers
without invitation, before agreements under
Article 17 are given. Such practices open the
possibility for pressure on States of origin. In
some cases, such as special needs cases, direct
contact may be appropriate and does not violate
Article 29, when the competent authority in the
State of origin has authorised the contact’.
So too, the Guide emphasises that states of origin
need to make a clear statement in their country
profile about exactly when they want prospective
adoptive parents to travel there:
‘433. . . . Some States of origin may want to
interview prospective adoptive parents before
making a final decision on a proposed match,
e.g., if a child to be adopted has special needs,
the state of origin may need assurance that the
prospective adoptive parents understand the
child’s condition and are capable of caring for
him or her …
434. Where possible, adoptive parents should
escort the child to the receiving state following
the adoption or grant of custody.
435. It may be valuable for the prospective
adoptive parents to spend time in the state of
origin, as their experience there may enable them
to know and understand the child’s life and
living conditions before the adoption and to
understand something of the background of the
child. Indeed, some States of origin require the
prospective adoptive parents to spend time there.’
19 The implementation and operation of the 1993 Hague
Inter-Country Adoption Convention: Guide to good prac-
tice, Guide no 1 (Hague Conference on Private International
Law, 2008).
20 Although the term ‘matching’ does not appear in the Con-
vention, it refers to the factors that go into the determina-
tion whether a particular child should be placed with a
particular adoptive family: Guide to Good Practice, at
para 7.2.5.
21 Paragraph 4.2.1.
22 Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur assume in relation to the South
African De Gree case, without arguing or debating this
point, that the ‘no contact’ principle applies pertinently to
the child, since one aspect of the applicants’ argument in
support of their claim to be awarded guardianship in that
case was that they had already built up a relationship with
the child in question (Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur ‘(Illicit)
transfer by De Gree’ (2007) 11 Law, Democracy and
Development 81, at p 96).
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The South African Act and regulations in relation to
inter-country adoption are silent on this issue of
contact with either birth parent or other carers, or the
child. In the light of this lacuna, it must be taken that
the Hague provisions, as explicated further in the
Guide to Good Practice, govern. It is, however,
important to remember that the legal status of the
guidelines per se is not clear.
The ‘prohibition’ of prior contact with the child
would also impact on practices such as ‘photo
listing’23 and advertising of children for adoption.
This of course is a violation of the child’s right to
privacy, as entrenched in Art 16 of the UNCRC and
Art 10 of the African Children’s Charter, respectively.
The assurance of privacy regarding the identity of the
birth parents (and extended family members) also
enables them to place the child for adoption with an
agency, secure in the knowledge that their actions will
not enter the public domain. In Kenya, the law
prohibits the advertisement of a child for adoption.24
In South Africa, s 252(1) of the Children’s Act
provides that no person may publish or cause to be
published in any form or by any means an
advertisement dealing with the placement for
adoption of a specific child. However, this does not
apply in respect of an advertisement by a child
protection organisation accredited to provide
adoption services for purposes of recruitment
according to prescribed guidelines, or other forms of
advertisements specified in regulation.25 Taking into
account the importance of privacy in adoptions,
s 69(1)(a) of the Children’s Welfare and Protection
Bill (2004) of Lesotho proposes that ‘[w]hen the High
Court hears adoption applications, the High Court
shall . . . proceed in camera unless open proceedings
will be in the best interests of the child …’.
The Role of the Judiciary
In the absence of completed legislation processes in
the region, the judiciary has played a significant role
in inter-country adoption rulings. Whilst the
well-publicised judgements of Malawian courts
continue to occupy the international press, some
other judgements are rather less well known.
An interesting 2004 case from Namibia is worth
noting. JD and Another and Minister of Health and
Social Services and Two Others26 concerned an
application to declare s 71(2) of the Children’s Act
No 53 of 1960 to be unconstitutional. The
application was brought by two German nationals
(husband and wife), who wanted to adopt a
Namibian child – which child was already in their
foster care – but who were unable to do so on
account of s 71(2)(f) of the Act, which provides that:
‘Save as provided in section twenty-two, a
Children’s Court to which application for an
order of adoption of a child is made shall not
grant the application unless –
…
(f) in the case of a child born of any person who is
a Namibian citizen, that the Applicant or one of
the Applicants is a Namibian citizen resident in
Namibia: Provided that the provisions of this
paragraph shall not apply –
i) where the applicant or one of the applicants
is a Namibian citizen or a relative of the
child and is resident outside Namibia; or
ii) where the applicant is not a Namibian
citizen or where both applicants are not
Namibian citizens but the applicant or the
applicants have the necessary residential
qualifications for the grant to him or them
under the Namibian Citizenship Act, (Act 14
of 1990), of a certificate or certificates of
naturalization as a Namibian citizen and has
or have made application for such certificate
or certificates
and the Minister has approved of the adoption.’
[Emphasis added]
The applicants alleged that ‘the limitation imposed by
the impugned provision upon their right to adopt the
child and upon the rights of the child to be adopted’
due to their non-citizen status did not fulfil the
criteria of the limitations clause of the Namibian
constitution (s 22). They contended that it was not
justifiable in that there was no rational connection to
a legitimate government purpose for this
differentiation between foreigners and nationals.27
In striking down this provision as unconstitutional
on two grounds – namely, as a violation of the rights
to found a family and to protection of the family, and
as a violation of the principle of non-discrimination
(against foreigners) – a number of disturbing dicta
pepper the judgment.
In relation to the first ground on which
constitutional invalidity was premised, the court
agreed that the impugned provision deprived a child
born of Namibian parents of the possibility of a
‘loving and stable family life’ through adoption by a
23 Lists of children available for adoption, usually through
public agencies, with photos and descriptions: see Mezmur,
fn 5 above, at p 21.
24 See www.attorney-general.go.ke. See too, s 178(1) of the
Kenyan Children’s Act 2001, which requires every member
or officer of an adoption society and every person having
any official duty in relation to adoption to treat any docu-
ment or information in relation to the adoption or proposed
adoption of a child as secret and confidential.
25 In the regulations as presently framed, no such exceptions
are provided for.
26 Case No (P) A 261/2002.
27 The applicants were permanently resident in Namibia, but
were unwilling to forego the benefits of their German
nationality by acquiring Namibian citizenship, and hence
having to renounce their German citizenship.
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non-Namibian: ‘[i]t ignores the stark reality that
foreigners may well be able to provide the best
“family” environment for a child born of a Namibian
parent and given up for adoption, if compared to
Namibian nationals.’
Further, whilst agreeing that the best option for a
child is a family made up of the biological parent(s)
of the child, the court opined that ‘the next best thing
to a biological family . . . is an adoptive family’.
Finally, in the context of this argument, the judge
alluded to the right of the child ‘to a “family” ’ as a
constitutional right in the Namibian context.
There are at least three wrong, contestable, or
otherwise alarming, propositions in the court’s
reasoning. First, the idea that non-Namibian adoptive
parents may be preferable to Namibian nationals able
and willing to adopt the same child is directly
contrary to the subsidiarity principle contained in the
Hague Adoption Convention, the African Children’s
Charter and the UNCRC. And, whilst patently
wrong, this line of thinking unfortunately indicates a
view not uncommonly held, even amongst some
Africans themselves.
Second, it is debatable whether the ‘next best thing’
to a biological family is indeed an adoptive family, as
opined by the court. Unless the biological family is
broadly defined to include the extended family,28
which is particularly important in an African
context,29 the statement does not hold water. Even
then, some would argue that long term in-country
fostering arrangements are preferable to an
out-of-country adoption. Indeed the wording of
Art 21(b) of the UNCRC and Art 24(b) of the
African Children’s Charter appear to reinforce the
notion that inter-country adoption should be resorted
to only if the child cannot be placed in ‘a foster or
adoptive family . . . in the child’s country of origin’.
Finally, just as there is no ‘right’ to adopt a child,
so too a child does not have the ‘right’ to a family in
international law. The Namibian constitutional
provision in Art 15(1), cited by the court, refers to
the children’s right, ‘subject to legislation enacted in
the best interests of the child, as far as possible . . . to
know and be cared for by their parents.’30 Reliance is
also placed on Art 14(3) of the Namibian
Constitution which provides that ‘the family is the
natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State.31 This
does not take the matter any further, however, and
the substantive content of the child’s right is to
parental or family care or to appropriate alternative
care when deprived of a family environment: there is
a distinction between the right to a family
environment, and the right to a family, which
privileges inter-country adoption above, for instance,
foster care or small cottage-style alternative care
settings in the country of origin.
And the court’s restrictive interpretation of the
application of the best interests of the child to the
narrow confines of the article in question (ie that the
best interests standard permits only legislation
limiting the child’s right to know and be cared for by
his or her parents) is dubious. The judge expressly
disallowed the possibility of a more extensive
application of the best interests standard, stating that
‘I see nothing in the language of article 15(1) of our
constitution that its framers intended to elevate the
best interests of the child standard to a constitutional
imperative against which all legislation, except that
dealing with the child’s right to know and to be cared
for by its parents, is to be measured’.32 This stance is
contrary to international law: both the UNCRC and
the African Children’s Charter emphasise that ‘in all
actions concerning children’ the best interests of the
child must be a primary (and in the African
Children’s Charter ‘the primary’) consideration. South
African Constitutional Court Justice Albie Sachs
expresses this idea thus:
‘The word paramount [in relation to the best
interests principle] is emphatic. Coupled with the
far reaching phrase ‘in every matter concerning
the child’, and taken literally, it would cover
virtually all laws and all forms of public action,
since very few measures would not have a direct
or indirect impact on children, and thereby
concern them.’33
In sum, the reasoning of the court in the Namibian
judgment is not child-centred, but rather focussed on
granting the prospective adoptive parents the outcome
that they sought.
Could a similar sentiment be raised in relation to
the first ‘Madonna case’ in Malawi, the inter-country
adoption of David Banda?34 In October 2006, a
Malawian High court granted an interim order, valid
for 18 months, permitting Madonna and her then
husband to take custody of the child, who at the time
lived in an orphanage, and to remove him from the
country. The intention was to consider making an
order of adoption after expiry of the interim order.
Upon expiry of the requisite period, the court was
28 See Art 5 of the UNCRC.
29 See Art 20(1) of the African Children’s Charter, which refers
to ‘parents or other persons responsible for the child …’.
30 This wording is taken directly from Art 7(1) of the UNCRC;
Art 9 is also in point, insofar as separation from parents
against their will can only take place when so determined by
competent authorities subject to judicial review and where
such separation is in the best interests of the child.
31 See, too, para 5 of the Preamble to the UNCRC.
32 See p 11 of the judgment.
33 See M v S 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC) para 25. See, too,
M Freeman, ‘Article 3: the best interests of the child’ in A
Allen et al (eds), A commentary on the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child (2007), at p 46, who
adopts a similar position.
34 Adoption Cause No 2 of 2006 In the Matter of the
Adoption of Children Act (Cap 26:01) and In the Matter of
David Banda (A Male Infant).
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faced with a significant obstacle in the form of s 3(5)
of the Malawi Adoption of Children Act (Cap 26:01)
which provides that ‘an adoption order shall not be
made in favour of any applicant who is not resident
in Malawi’.35 The judge was mindful of the UNCRC
and the African Children’s Charter, referring to them
in detail in his judgment. Moreover, he commenced
by stressing that the residence requirement ‘was and
is intended to protect the child and to ensure that the
adoption is well intended’.36 Nevertheless, the judge
had no difficulty ultimately in overriding the
residency requirement, posing the question ‘whether
“residence” is an end in itself in the context in which
it is used, especially bearing in mind that we are
dealing with welfare of children. Or is residence
merely a means to an end?’37 and concluding that ‘I
am left in no doubt that the best interests of the
infant would . . . be achieved by granting this
petition.’38
We would argue that the judgement effectively
gives primacy to both the best interests principle and
the subsidiarity principle. The judge noted that:
‘The infant in the instant case was among our
many materially deprived children whose only
remaining parent was forced, because of his
circumstances, to place him at an orphanage . . .
This was the closest to a local solution that the
only surviving parent and relatives could get. In
seeking to adopt the infant the petitioners are not
therefore in the way of any permanent domestic
solution for the infant’.39
It certainly cannot be said that the judgement was
motivated solely by the desire to accommodate the
needs of the celebrity petitioners.
Madonna (2) is of recent provenance, judgment
having been delivered on 3 April 2009.40 Here
Madonna applied to adopt a 3-year-old girl, whose
mother had died shortly after her birth and who was
at the time of application residing in an orphanage in
Malawi. Once again the judge was confronted by the
provisions of s 3(5) of the Adoption of Children Act.
Contrary to the earlier ruling of the High Court, the
court held that residence – which she describes as the
bedrock of adoption – involved some degree of
permanence, which could not be ascribed to
Madonna who had ‘jetted into the country during the
weekend just days prior to the hearing …’.41 The
judge was not prepared to waive this requirement,
stating that:
‘it is necessary that we look beyond a particular
petitioner, and maybe even a particular
benefactor . . . and consider the consequences of
opening the doors too wide. Anyone could come
to Malawi and quickly arrange for an adoption
that might have grave consequences on the very
child that the law seeks to protect.’42
The judgment cited Art 24 of the African Children’s
Charter and emphasised that, in terms of Art 24(b),
inter-country adoption may be considered only as a
last resort if the child cannot be placed in a foster or
adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be
cared for in the child’s country of origin. Rather
strangely, the judge then did not answer her own
question as to whether the child could possibly ‘be
placed in a foster or adoptive family’, stating rather
that:
‘It is evident however that CJ is no longer subject
to the conditions of poverty of her place of
birth . . . since her admission at Kondanani
Orphanage. In the circumstances, can it be said
that CJ cannot in any suitable manner be cared
for in her country of origin? The answers to my
questions are negative. In my view “in any
suitable manner” refers to the style of life of the
indigenous or as close a life to the one that the
child has been leading since birth.’43
This case sets an unfortunate precedent, privileging
long-term institutional care in an unwarranted
fashion,44 and in a way which we believe runs
directly contrary to the ‘any suitable manner’
requirement under both the UNCRC and the African
Children’s Charter.45 In our view, placement in an
orphanage as a permanent solution for a
three-year-old child does not appear to serve the
child’s best interests, and is based on a somewhat
distorted understanding of suitable care.
35 See above, Mezmur fn 10, at pp 387–388.
36 At p 18 of the unreported judgment.
37 Ibid, at p 16.
38 Ibid, at p 26.
39 At pp 24–25. The Malawi Human Rights Commission
(which intervened as amicus curiae) had submitted that the
practice of inter-country adoption should ordinarily follow
the following path: family-based solutions over institutional
placement; permanent solutions over inherently temporary
solutions; and national (domestic) solutions over those
involving other countries (see the judgment at p 23).
40 Adoption Cause No 1 of 2009 In the Matter of the
Adoption of Children Act (Cap 26:01) and In the Matter of
CJ (A Female Infant).
41 At p 4 of the unreported judgment.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid, at p 6.
44 It is to be noted that the UNCRC Committee, in its
concluding observations on the State party report of
Malawi, raised concern about the increasing number of
orphanages and children’s homes, recommending to the
State party, inter alia to promote and support family-type
forms of alternative care for children deprived of parental
care, including foster care in order to reduce the resort to
residential care. See UNCRC Committee, Concluding
Observations: Second Periodic Report of Malawi (January
2009), at para 44.
45 See Art 24(b) of the African Children’s Charter and
Art 21(b) of the UNCRC.
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Madonna (2) resulted in two directly conflicting
judgements from the High Court of Malawi, thus
creating not only confusion, but compromising the
best interests of children.46 Divergent judicial
approaches to inter-country adoption are becoming
characteristic of regional developments in this sphere,
and this underpins some of our final conclusions, set
out below.
However, the Madonna saga did not end here, as
Madonna immediately appealed to the Supreme
Court of Appeal against the refusal of the adoption
order.47 The court (per Chief Justice Munlo, SC, with
whom two other judges of appeal concurred) handed
down judgment on 12 June 2009, allowing the appeal
and granting the adoption order. The judgment
focussed mainly on the meaning of the word
‘residence’ in s 3(5) of the Act. The court held that
the question of residence ‘is a factor to be considered
in adoption cases even though it is not the only
factor.’ The duration of the stay is only one of the
matters the court must consider. Whether there is
residence is a question which:
‘is no longer tied to the notion of permanence as
a deciding factor. The legal notion of residence is
distinct from that found in the dictionary and is
constituted by the fact of physical presence in a
place as is not fleeting and transitory. Any period
of physical presence however short may
constitute residence if it shown that the presence
is no transitory; if the period has just begun, this
will be a question of intention of the party. There
is even no need for one to own property in a
place in order for him to be capable of residing
there.’48
According to the court, Madonna specifically came to
Malawi for the purpose of the application for
adoption, and was not in the country by chance or as
a mere sojourner.49 As a result, it was concluded that,
at the time of the application, Madonna was resident
in Malawi.50
A cursory look at this conclusion would practically
mean that, for the purpose of inter-country adoption,
prospective adoptive parent(s) need only be physically
present in Malawi at the time of the adoption
application to qualify as being a resident of the
country. This is completely different from, for
instance, the practice in Tanzania, where a
prospective adoptive parent is considered as a resident
only if he or she ‘holds a Resident Permit (Class A, B,
or C), a Dependent’s Pass, or an Exemption Permit
and lives in Tanzania’.51 By the same token, in
Morocco, official residence certificates must be
produced to prove resident status.52
However, rather creating confusion for future cases,
the SCA added further elaboration to the grounds for
its finding that Madonna’s presence at the time of the
adoption petition should qualify her as a resident.
The SCA added:
‘And on that day she [Madonna] had already
adopted another infant known as David Banda
from Malawi. The Appellant has plans to travel
to Malawi frequently with her adopted children
in order to instill in them a cultural pride and
knowledge of their country of origin. The Judge
in the court below had evidence before her
indicating that the Appellant had a project in
Malawi which had noble and immediate ideas of
investing in the improvement of the lives of more
disadvantaged children in Malawi. It is clear
from this evidence that the Appellant in this case
is not a mere sojourner in this country but has a
targeted long term presence aimed at
ameliorating the lives of more disadvantaged
children in Malawi.’53
In this regard, it is far from the truth to suppose that
the approach to defining who is a resident in respect
of inter-country adoption in Malawi is put to rest.
Questions abound, such as: Does a prospective
adoptive parent need further connection to Malawi,
like a project, to be declared a resident for the
purpose of inter-country adoption? Does a
prospective adoptive parent also need to have plans
to bring a child back to Malawi in order to qualify as
a resident? What does a ‘targeted long term presence’
mean? Or is a ‘targeted long term presence’ an
additional requirement for status as a resident? Only
future practice related to the issue will shed light on
these questions.
Turning to the question of the welfare (best
interests) of the child, the court pointed out that, in
its view, a court of law dealing with the adoption of
an infant opined that, under the Act, inter-country
adoption cannot be said to have been the last resort
in this case. On the facts, no Malawian family had
come forward to adopt the child, nor had there been
any attempt to place her in a foster family:
46 It has been alleged that after the first Madonna case, a
veritable flood of applications for inter-country adoptions of
children in Malawi has served before the High Courts. This
has led to the development of draft guidelines for judges
dealing with inter-country adoption applications (personal
communication, Judge Edward Twea, 13 March 2009).
47 Msca Adoption Appeal No 28 of 2009 In Re: The Adoption
of Children Act CAP 26:01; In Re: CJA Female Infant of c/o
P.O.Box 30871, Chichiri, Blantyre 3 [2009] MESC 1.
48 At p 16 of the unreported judgment.
49 Ibid, at p 17.
50 Ibid.
51 US Department of State, Intercountry Adoption: Tanzania,
(March 2009) available at: http://adoption.state.gov/
country/tanzania.html.
52 US Department of State, Intercountry Adoption: Morocco,
(February 2007) available at: http://adoption.state.gov/
country/morocco.html.
53 SCA infant CJ case, above fn 47.
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‘The question whether in these circumstances it
can be said that the infant CJ cannot in any
suitable manner be cared for in her country of
origin depends on what options she has on the
ground. On the evidence infant CJ can hardly be
said to have many options. As a matter of fact
there are only two options. She can either stay in
Kondonani Orphanage and have not family life
at all or she can be adopted by the Appellant and
grow up in a family that the Appellant is
offering.’54
This being the case, the welfare (best interests) of the
child indicated clearly that she should be adopted by
the foreign parent.
As observed above, the treatment of the residency
requirement by the Supreme Court of Appeal, while
very liberal, still leaves a few questions unanswered.
It is hoped that future practice related to the issue
will shed light on these questions, and that the
meaning of residence would not stand in the way of
promoting children’s best interests. In retrospect, the
approach the judge took in the infant DB case, which
viewed the residency requirement as being merely a
means to an end – the end being the best interests of
the child,55 is more instructive, and should still carry
a lot of weight in approaching the issue in a
child-friendly fashion.56
The final judgment to which we would like to refer
is the South African Constitutional Court decision in
AD and another v DW and others (Centre for Child
Law as amicus curiae and Department of Social
Development as Intervening Party).57 The matter
arose from an application for sole custody and sole
guardianship of a South African child by American
citizens. Eschewing the conventional adoption route
before a children’s court, they instead pressed their
claim in the High Court, with the intention of
thereafter taking the child home to the United States
and formally adopting her there. The High Court
found that the Child Care Act58 and children’s court
adoption procedures were available to the applicants
and provided the appropriate safeguards. These
procedures should, according to the court, be viewed
as the standard accepted procedure by which South
African children are to be adopted, including
inter-country adoptions.59
This reasoning was by and large upheld by the
majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal, to which
court the applicants then resorted.60 In brief, the
majority held that it was not in the child’s best
interests that she be removed from South Africa in
terms of a custody and guardianship order without
the protection and safeguards of an adoption first
effected in the South African children’s court. The
court was not prepared to sanction an adoption
procedure which was in conflict with international
treaties which South Africa had ratified and which
are designed to safeguard the child’s welfare.61 Not
satisfied with this outcome, the prospective adoptive
applicants pressed their suit further in the
Constitutional Court.
Prior to the hearing of the case, the parties (after
some active encouragement by the court) reached an
agreement in terms of which adoption proceedings
would be instituted and finalised in the Johannesburg
children’s court. However, this did not preclude a
consideration by the court of two key issues, ‘in the
interests of the many children whose future will be at
stake in days to come …’.62 These issues were
whether the High Court had jurisdiction to hear
applications for sole custody and sole guardianship
intended as a precursor to adopting a South African
child abroad, and the constitutionally correct
application of the subsidiarity principle.
The Constitutional Court confirmed the inherent
jurisdiction of the High Court to act as the upper
guardian of all children, and stated that, in this
capacity, it had not been dispossessed of its
jurisdiction to make a sole custody and sole
guardianship order to foreigners desirous of effecting
an adoption in a foreign jurisdiction. The Child Care
Act should not be interpreted as creating by
implication an inflexible jurisdictional bar in this
regard. This was not, however, one of the exceptional
cases where bypassing the children’s court procedure
could have been justified. The majority of the
Supreme Court of Appeal had thus been correct in
deciding that the granting of a sole custody and sole
guardianship order, either by the High Court or by
itself, would not have been the appropriate judicial
response.63
In our view, however, bearing in mind the
international instruments concerning cross-border
54 At p 18 of the unreported judgment.
55 See infant DB case, above fn 34, at p 18.
56 See Mezmur, ‘From Angelina (to Madonna) to Zoe’s Ark’
(fn 2 above), at pp 161–163.
57 2008 (3) SA 183 (CC).
58 This Act, No 74 of 1983, will be repealed when the new
Children’s Act 38 of 2005 comes into full operation, hope-
fully later this year. As stated above, the latter Act incorpo-
rates the Hague Convention principles and procedures into
South African domestic law, the entire text of the Hague
Adoption Convention forming one of the schedules to the
Act.
59 De Gree and Another v Webb and Others (Centre for Child
Law, University of Pretoria, Amicus Curiae) 2006 (6) SA 51
(W).
60 For a detailed discussion of the four different judgments
handed down in the Supreme Court of Appeal, see Sloth-
Nielsen and Mezmur (fn 22 above).
61 De Gree and Another v Webb and Others (Centre for Child
Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (5) SA 184 (SCA).
62 Paragraph [20].
63 See paras [23]–[34].
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adoptions to which South Africa has acceded, the
jurisdictional barriers to the High Court exercising its
powers as upper guardian in this type of case are
insurmountable.64 The lack of the guarantees of
independent background reports; the absence of
involvement of the designated Central Authorities and
of a framework for inter-state co-operation and
mutual recognition of adoption orders; the lack of
safeguards guaranteeing respect for fundamental
rights (such as the child’s right to privacy and the
need for proper counselling for biological parents,
adoptive parents and the child, if appropriate), and
the aim of preventing improper financial gains and
combating child trafficking, not to mention the need
to keep proper records of the background of the child
– all of these considerations militate against the use of
the High Court mechanism to confer parental status
upon a prospective adoptive parent from another
country via a guardianship and custody order.
Turning to subsidiarity, the Constitutional Court
held that the principle should be adhered to as a ‘core
factor’ governing inter-country adoptions, but that it
is not ‘the ultimate governing factor in inter-country
adoptions’.65 There can be few who would quibble
with this. However, clearly alluding to the primacy of
the best interests principle, the court went on to note
that ‘[d]etermining the best interests of the child
cannot be circumscribed by mechanical legal formulae
or through rigid hierarchical ranking of care options.’
According to the court, this in practice requires:
‘that a contextualised case-by-case enquiry be
conducted by child protection practitioners and
judicial officers versed in the principles involved
in order to find the solution best adjusted to the
child, taking into account his or her individual
emotional wants and the perils innate to each
potential solution.’66
This statement does not really address the problem:
what is the true role of subsidiarity and how are the
mentioned experts supposed to assess whether it has
been met or not? Surely the second Madonna case,
discussed above, illustrates clearly how differences of
opinion regarding subsidiarity can arise.
This case leaves one with a niggling uneasiness that
the nettle was not properly grasped, and future
litigants may well, in the reasoning of the
Constitutional Court, find loopholes to bypass the
carefully engineered structure – national and
international – governing inter-country adoptions.
Our concerns are not mere theoretical ones. It is
sobering to have to report that, three protracted,
time-consuming and expensive court cases
notwithstanding, about six months after the child at
the heart of the AD v DW case returned to the
United States with her adoptive parents, the adoptive
mother suffered an undisclosed health crisis and the
little girl was placed in the custody of, and was to be
adopted by, another American family.67 This outcome
illustrates poignantly that, if the ‘first set’ of adoptive
parents had succeeded in taking the child out of
South Africa under a sole guardianship and sole
custody order, the adoption in their favour might not
have gone through in the United States because of the
‘health crisis’ of the prospective adoptive mother. Had
that happened, the child would have been in a rather
precarious legal position in the United States pending
an order of adoption being applied for there by the
‘second set’ of adoptive parents. However, as there
was already a South African adoption order in place
before the child arrived in the USA with the first set
of adoptive parents, that order stood and the child’s
legal status as the adopted child of US citizens was
secure pending the granting of a new adoption order
in favour of the second set of adoptive parents.
International Dimensions
The above discussion of case law brings to the fore
the role of the international players, notably the
Hague Permanent Bureau staff, Central Authorities,
foreign adoption agencies, treaty bodies and the
international media. This is because, in the absence of
a uniform approach and because legislation in the
Southern and Eastern African sub-region has not been
finalised, judge-made law in this region is resulting in
inconsistencies (and sometimes incoherence) in the
interpretation and application of the principles and
rules governing inter-country adoptions. Moreover,
developments are seemingly taking place in the
absence of a clear role for Central Authorities and
other governmental structures, which is highly
undesirable. As previously stated:
‘… inter-country adoption is not purely a matter
for private legal regulation . . .[it] adds the
foreign Central Authority, the foreign accredited
adoption service provider, the local Central
Authority and local accredited inter-country
adoption service provider to the equation. Hence
it is a status changing event which falls properly
within the sphere of the executive branch of
government.’68
However, simply urging governments to ratify the
Hague Adoption Convention is, in our view, not
enough. For instance, Namibia is intending, in the
64 The new Children’s Act provides, in s 25, that when
application for guardianship of a child is made by a non-
South Africa citizen, the application must be regarded as an
inter-country adoption application for the purposes of the
Hague Adoption Convention and Ch 16 of the Act.
65 Paragraph [49].
66 Paragraph [50].
67 See K Maughan, ‘New Home for Baby R’, The Star, posted
on the Web by Independent Online on 29 September 2008
(see www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=
13&art_id=vn20080929054659804C21138) (last accessed
on 5 February 2010).
68 See Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, above fn 22, at 88–89.
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child law reform process that is underway, to ratify
the Hague Adoption Convention. In October 2009,
Professor William Duncan, Deputy Secretary General
of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law, visited Namibia to consult with those persons
and bodies involved in the child law reform process,
including UNICEF, the Legal Assistance Centre and
the Ministry of Gender Equality and Child Welfare,
on (inter alia) its proposed ratification of the Hague
Adoption Convention. This consultation is provided
for in the Detailed pathway to signature and
ratification/accession, which appears as Annex 1 to
the Guide to Good Practice. Professor Duncan made
suggestions to the drafting team (the Legal Assistance
Centre) on the contents of the chapter in the draft
Child Care and Protection Bill which deal with
inter-country adoption on the implementation of the
Hague Adoption Convention, as also on the contents
of the draft Adoption Regulations designed to place
some further regulations in the inter-country adoption
process, pending the coming into operation of the
Convention. It would appear that the Hague
Permanent Bureau will consider to communicate with
and assist Namibia in respect of implementation of
the Convention – one possible area identified already
is the need for training of the key players, including
the Central Authority and the Judiciary. This is most
encouraging and should certainly be a route to be
followed by to her countries considering ratification.
What we therefore conclude is that there needs to
be proper co-ordination between all the relevant role
players in the inter-country adoption arena.
Governments, the judiciary and the international
community need to harmonise efforts to embed good
practices based on sound principles and experience. In
this endeavour, staff of the Hague Permanent Bureau
should play a leading role.
Proper guidance and clarification from treaty
bodies, notably the UNCRC and the African
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of
the Child (ACERWC) on the central concepts of
inter-country adoption (and alternative care in
general) is also crucial. For instance, unfortunately,
the UNCRC Committee has been sending confusing
(if not contradictory) messages as far as what is to be
generally considered a measure of last resort in the
alternative care scheme for children deprived of their
family environment.
To illustrate: the UNCRC Committee on a number
of occasions has labelled inter-country adoption to be
a measure of last resort.69 Despite this position, that
continues to surface in its concluding observations on
state party reports in terms of the UNCRC, in
General Comment No 3, titled ‘HIV/AIDS and the
rights of the child’, the same Committee remarked
that:
‘… any form of institutionalized care for children
should only serve as a measure of last resort, and
that measures must be fully in place to protect
the rights of the child and guard against all
forms of abuse and exploitation.’70
In the context of children with disabilities, the
UNCRC Committee has reiterated a similar
position.71 This leaves the UNCRC Committee’s
position as regards the question, ‘is it inter-country
adoption or institutionalisation that should generally
be considered as a measure of last resort?’
unanswered.72
Finally, an extensive education campaign to
promote ethical reporting in the international media
may be warranted. For instance, it must be noted
that, contrary to many international media reports,
orphans are not necessarily ‘adoptable’ children, and
it is not necessarily in the interests of an orphan child
to be internationally adopted.73 The fact that the
media often uses the words ‘orphanhood’
interchangeably with ‘adoptability’ continues to
contribute towards existing misconceptions about
inter-country adoption.
69 See introduction section above.
70 UNCRC Committee, General Comment No 3 HIV/AIDS
and the rights of the child (CRC/GC/2003/3) (2003), at
para 35.
71 Under General Comment No 9 on the The rights of children
with disabilities (CRC/C/GC/9) (2007), at para 47, it is
stated that the UCRC Committee ‘urges States parties to use
the placement in institution only as a measure of last resort,
when it is absolutely necessary and in the best interests of
the child’.
72 [Emphasis added] ‘Generally’ because it is the conventional
(non-exceptional) cases that are being taken into account
when determining the general preference to be adopted in
making decisions between alternative care options.
73 Graff contends that Westerners have been sold the myth of a
world orphan crisis. She challenges the assumption that
there exist millions of children who are waiting for their
‘forever families’ to rescue them from lives of abandonment
and abuse. See Graff, ‘Foreign Policy: The lie we love’
(2008) 69 Foreign Policy 1, available at: http://www.crin.
org/docs/lie_we_love.pdf (accessed 10 May 2009). More-
over, Cantwell reminds us that caution needs to be exercised
not to confuse ‘adoptable children’ with ‘children in out of
home care’. See Cantwell, ’Intercountry Adoption: A Com-
ment on the Number of ‘Adoptable’ Children and the
Number of Persons Seeking to Adoption Internationally’
(2003) 5 Judges’ Newsletter (Hague Conference on Private
International Law) 70, at p 71.
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